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venezuela: political changes 
in the Chávez era
RAFAEL DUARTE VILLA
Rise and fall of the Punto Fijo Pact 
any analysis that is made about democratic venezuela, which began in 1958, after the fall of the dictatorship of Marcos Peres Jiménez, shares the idea that the democratic venezuelan system, which 
operated between the years 1958 and 1989, had as a basis for its stability a 
“populist conciliation pact” of the elites, thus named in the classic work by 
Juan Carlos Reis (1980, p. 315). the material and institutional expression 
of this conciliation pact was the so-called Punto Fijo Pact. Rooted in the 
Constitution of 1961, from an institutional standpoint, “the pact recognized 
that the existence of various political parties and their natural divergences 
could be channeled within the boundaries of agendas of acquaintanceship 
and [in the recognition] that common interests existed in the survival of the 
system” (Romero, 1989, p. 25). Moreover, the pact of governance excluded 
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sectors, such as the Communist Party, considered to be destabilizing forces of 
the nascent democratic system. In relation to foreign policy, the venezuelan 
political elites were able to develop a defensive diplomacy of the internal 
democratic institutionality by promoting the so-called Betancourt doctrine, 
by which venezuela would not recognize any government on the continent 
that had its origin in a coup d’état. 
the material base of the Punto Fijo Pact was ensured by clientelistic 
distribution of the petroleum income. the existence of petroleum enabled the 
manner of the state’s intervention in the economy, and also its relationship 
with the other political actors, such as parties, unions, armed forces and the 
private sector. all these sectors were subsidized by the state, a fact which 
inhibited any possibility of criticism about the future consequences of the 
clientele model of conciliation adopted at the time. It is necessary to underline 
this premise: it is not possible to understand venezuelan political life starting 
from the beginning of the democratic period in 1958 without understanding 
the role developed by the petroleum resource, nor is the country’s economic 
life comprehensible without an understanding of the role of the state as 
protagonist, that, as a last resort, presents itself as the sole owner of the 
petroleum resource (Cf. villa, 1999). 
supported on this political base of the Punto Fijo Pact, and the 
material base derived from petroleum, venezuela’s political system had solid 
institutional engineering  that persisted for nearly thirty years, and  came to be 
described in terms of the following constitutive points: 
1) a bipartisan system characterized by minimal ideological and 
programmatic differentiation, a fact which suffocated the small 
parties and left the minorities without active voice in the national 
scenario (ellner, 2003, p.20). Within this system, the democratic 
action Party (acción democrática ad), representing a socio-
democratic project and the (Comitê de organização Política eleitoral 
Independente – Copei) representing a democratic-Christian Project, 
alternated in power without other competitors between the years 
1959 and 1988. as alfredo Ramos Jiménez suggests: in the last 
forty years “[...] access to the government in venezuela was always 
mediated by the party. this explains in part the stability of the 
political system in the face of the destabilizing options and also 
the fact of conflict almost never existing between the state and the 
Governing party” (Jiménez, 2000, p. 7). after 1973, both of the 
parties together held 83% of the chairs of the House in a bicameral 
legislative system. 
2) the venezuelan parties were highly institutionalized and not simple 
vehicles for ambitious leaders. the principal political leaders, 
especially Rómulo Betancourt (ad) and Rafael Caldera (Copei), 
avoided polarized disputes. In other words, the democratic system 
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counted on mature political leadership that, learning from past 
experiences, discarded sectarianism and provided advantageous 
pacts between parties. as Levine suggests (1978, pp. 93-98), 
the venezuelan political leadership was not disposed to repeat 
experiences of intense rivalry, that could put them on the brink of 
new coups d’état. this factor, in turn allowed the establishment of 
a coalition democracy that opened channels of participation of the 
smaller parties1, and that also allowed bipartisan control on the part 
of the ad and the Copei, for high level positions in institutions 
such as the Congress, the Judicial supreme Court and in the unions 
themselves. (ellner, 2003, p. 21).
Furthermore, the nationalist and anti-imperialist speech peculiar to 
the populist Latin-american leadership, such as Haya de la torre, 
Juan domingo Perón and Getúlio vargas, was always absent from 
the principal venezuelan leadership. Rómulo Betancourt (ad) as 
much as Rafael Caldera always cultivated a good relationship with 
the united states, even at times cooperating with the us in its 
hemispheric policies of politically isolating Cuba. (alexander, 1982).
3) the large venezuelan parties had roots in all strata of society. 
they were multi-class parties, but their primary composition, 
however, originated in the middle class. the petroleum resources 
are important for explaining this fact. according to Karl (1987) and 
Hellinger (1984), the petroleum economy had a positive political 
impact to the extent that such resources helped in the formation of 
a strong urban middle class, from which emerged the leadership of 
the principal political parties and unions. this social background 
of the leadership, however, did not prevent them from having a 
multi-class party dialogue and affiliation, avoiding having ad any 
more than Copei becoming particularly identified as representatives 
of the middle class. this can be summed up by the fact that the 
distribution of the petroleum resources made itself felt among all 
strata of society, which kept the level of social conflict under party 
control. 
4) the two large parties of the puntofijismo democratic system, ad and 
Copei, gave priority to party discipline, which in fact strengthened 
them. Both were rigid, almost Leninist structures, which could not 
forgive dissidents.
5) Finally, the venezuelan political system was sufficiently open to 
generating attractive opportunities not only for the coalition 
partners but also for other small parties. (ellner, 2003, p. 22). the 
two large parties took care not to turn governing into a zero sum 
game. Representatives of the small political parties were incorporated 
into the exercise of second level responsibility of positions, and some 
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of the sectors from the left had some proportional representation 
in the powerful Worker’s Center of venezuela (Ctv-Central de 
trabalhadores da venezuela), which, in turn, was controlled by the 
ad. this integration of representation of political interests, besides 
transferring institutional stability, prevented an attraction to radical 
political options from either the left or the right.
Besides this, there were also incorporated “[…] other actors, such as the 
armed forces, the church, entrepreneurs and the sense of its institutionalization 
and in the aggregation of social and corporate interests” (villa, 1999, pp. 
137-138). such facts, in this way, reveal that the closing of the party universe 
enabled those sectors of society that had become institutionalized to negotiate 
their interests directly with the leadership of the two parties. actors such as 
the unions, which at that time were mainly represented by the Ctv, developed 
a corporatist link with ad, which then guaranteed them the exchange of its 
support, distribution of positions and benefits, a system similar to the Brazilian 
corporatism of the vargas era. 
Given this solidity of the venezuelan pact of governance, the political 
instability that began in early 1989 surprised the political actors as much as it 
did analysts.
the period between the years 1989 and 1993 is of fundamental 
importance for the definition and comprehension of the depth of the crisis that 
began, and the room the principal actors of puntofijismo had for maneuvering. 
at the end of 1988 venezuelans, nostalgic for the time of the petroleum 
bonanza in the 1970s, again elected social-democrat Carlos andrés Pérez from 
the ad.  Pérez had previously governed the country between 1973 and 1978, 
the period coinciding with the first large international petroleum price increase. 
once elected, Pérez reacted to the crisis by adopting a neoliberal 
package at the beginning of 1989. However, the measures were not well 
received by the popular venezuelan sectors. the neoliberal option instituted 
in 1989, which included a strong financial adjustment, privatization of the 
principal state companies with the exception of the petroleum industry, and 
the drying up of the state’s administrative machine (in a country where 
the state and its companies were the principal employers), never roused the 
same popular enthusiasm “as the interventionist policies of the past. While 
interventionism had reached its fullest expression in the 1976 nationalization 
of the petroleum industry, applauded by the country and a source of national 
pride, the neoliberal period [inaugurated with Pérez] assisted in the large scale 
transference of national companies” (ellner, 2003, p. 310).
the first strong symptom of political instability of the venezuelan 
democratic system was the event that would be known as Caracaso, on 27 
February, 1989, which constituted a repressive military reaction directed at 
the protest by the poorest sectors of the population (who came from the hills 
and hovels - cerros and ranchos or the slums of venezuela) of Caracas, against 
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the neoliberal measures of Pérez. at this confrontation approximately three 
hundred people died, according to official figures, and more than a thousand 
according to unofficial sources.
the escalation of political instability, in turn, did not end with this 
incident. In fact, the venezuelan democratic institutions derived from the 
Punto Fijo Pact would never overcome the destabilizing effects of Caracaso. 
In what followed, a group of officials, led by then Lieutenant-Colonel Hugo 
Chávez Frias, deepened the venezuelan political crisis, taking charge of a coup 
attempt in February of 1992. Closing the drama of the venezuelan democratic 
tragedy of the period, the presidential institution was profoundly demoralized 
when then-president Carlos andrés Pérez left office in 1993 under accusations 
of corruption.
the relationship between the behavior of the petroleum economy and 
the political system are also important in explaining the crisis of puntofijismo. 
the economic downturn in the 1980s affected in a relevant manner the 
essential material goods that were redistributed to the venezuelan regime, 
a fact which showed that the political efficacy of the Punto Fijo Pact was 
intrinsically linked to the behavior of the petroleum profit model. With the 
crisis of the 1980s, the so-called lost decade, all of Latin america confronted 
an economic collapse that ended by profoundly conditioning the neoliberal 
economic options taken by the political elite of the Latin-american region. 
In the case of venezuela, the situation was aggravated due to the fall of the 
international prices of oil at the beginning of 1984, and also to the increase 
in weight of foreign debt. the democratic regime, which between 1965 and 
1980 had been able to maintain a relatively constant rhythm of salary increases 
in relation to social spending as a clear result of the oil price increases, had this 
capacity reduced. the per capita GnP which had reached its peak at the end of 
the 1970s fell nearly 20% in the 1980s, causing indexes to regress to those of 
the 1960s (Roberts, 2003, p. 80; Crisp, 2000, p. 175).
With a certain perplexity analysts recognized that venezuela seemed to 
be the victim of its own institutional and socio-economic success of its thirty 
years of democracy. the same factors that had previously been so important 
for the success and stability of the venezuelan democracy, such as excessive 
centralism and state paternalism, the party pacts originating from within the 
state, the excessive institutionalizing of bipartisanism, its export economy 
based on petroleum, and even the electoral system based on proportional 
representation, were now identified as causes of the democratic instability itself.
the diagnosis pointed out that such factors, which had previously 
guaranteed the success of venezuelan democracy, closed the space for 
incorporating new political and social actors “with decision-making capacity 
in the political system” (ellner, 2003, p. 25). a state reform that might have 
administrative decentralization as a goal was then tried. the governors who 
had previously been recommended by the President of the Republic and the 
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mayors, who were indirectly elected by their own city legislatures, came to 
be elected by popular vote. these mild reforms, however, were insufficient 
to politically relegitimize and reinstitutionalize the Punto Fijo actors, who 
were by then incapable of understanding that it was not possible to placate 
and maintain intact a system mounted by them, at the same time that the 
institutional and material conditions of such a system were deteriorating. It 
is thus comprehension of what were necessary changes in the political system 
that is perhaps associated with the principal value of the emergence of Hugo 
Chávez’s prominence within the venezuelan political scenario.
nevertheless, the burial of puntofijismo only occurred in the second 
term of Rafael Caldera, who had previously governed the country between 
1968 and 1972. Rafael Caldera was the only major politician of the traditional 
Punto Fijo elite who understood that events such as Caracaso and the military 
insurrection headed by Hugo Chávez were not matters of circumstance, 
products of adventurers such as some political sectors characterized them, 
but reflected a general political and social discontent with the incapability of 
democratic institutions when confronted with economic crisis and the absence 
of institutionalized channels of political participation. Caldera took advantage 
of his ability to interpret the significance of the crisis in a different manner 
and, having abandoned his original party (Copei) and offered himself with a 
populist speech that approached the demands of the popular sectors and the 
middle class, was elected president at the end of 1993.
once elected, however, Caldera continued the agenda initiated by 
Pérez, deepening the neoliberal measures under the pompous name of 
Venezuelan Agenda.
More than putting puntofijismo back on its track prior to 1989, 
Caldera’s second term deepened three nearly irreversible feelings among the 
venezuelan social sectors about the political system: low esteem of traditional 
political parties and their leadership, of which Caldera was a symbol; a sense 
that there was an absence of power that a political elite reminiscent of 1958 
was incapable of replacing; and, finally, the desire of the popular sectors, and 
even from the middle class, to renew their elite directors so that they could 
once again operate the redistributive clientele system that had operated until 
the 1980’s. a clear example of this was the fact that The Radical Cause (La 
Causa Radical), a regional party and labor’s social base, was able to be a viable 
electoral option in the 1993 elections. It should be stressed that for some 
observers this would not have been completely clarified if their candidate, 
andrés velásquez, had not won the presidential election that year. (see 
Hellinger, 2003).
The innovative policies of the Chávez phenomenon
With the weakening of puntofijismo, a kind of vacuum was established 
in venezuelan politics in spite of the willingness of several political sectors 
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to fill in that vaccum, within what could be identified as “the unions, the 
professional and management sectors and the military quarter” (Hellinger, 
2003). However, none of these alternatives had been as well accepted by the 
population as the one proposed by Hugo Chávez. 
It should be pointed out that even Chávez himself, at the beginning 
did not well understand the political dimensions of his 1992 coup attempt, 
and why it had been so well received by large contingents of the population,  
so intense was the doubt in the democratic leadership of Punto Fijo. this 
initial incomprehension by Chávez in relation to the exact significance of the 
forces on behalf of institutional change that had been set in motion could 
be related to the fact that in the 1993 elections, he and the Revolutionary 
Bolívar Movement 200 (MBR200, his original political movement from 
when he was an officer), called for electoral abstention. after 1993, Hugo 
Chávez reexamined his position and, given his great popular acceptance, 
proposed modifying the institutions “from the inside out,” by means of the 
national Constituent assembly. With this it became almost vital to modify 
his sustaining political action strategy. It became necessary to defend his 
participation in the next political contests. thus arose a Chavista  party 
machinery then known as the Movement of the Fifth Republic (MvR) (see 
Marques, 2003).
the radicalism of the Chavista  discourse, which preceded the 1998 
presidential elections, transformed him into the one who best interpreted the 
desire for popular change in relation to the politically dominant class, as well 
as in relation to the institutions inherited from the Constitution of 1961. the 
harsh language that Chávez directed at his opponents in his long speeches 
was the idem sentire of all that his social base wanted to have expressed to the 
elites in the two lost decades of the 1980s and 1990s (Cf. villa, 1999). as to 
Chávez’s emergence, the mistakes made by some of his adversaries contributed 
considerably, as well as the depth of the feeling demonstrated by venezuelans 
in rejection of the traditional parties.
In relation to these two points, the most notable example was 
expressed by the charismatic presidential aspirant Irene sáez. this politically 
independent former Miss universe had had two sufficiently well-accepted 
managerial positions in the 1990s as mayor of the city of Chacao, one of the 
various municipalities that divide the capital, Caracas. this positive political 
past qualified her as a candidate of substance, a fact that was rapidly expressed 
in high numbers reached in electoral polls, which she led for more than a 
year. sáez, sensing that she could not win without the support of a political 
machine, committed the mistake of accepting the support of the Copei party. 
the effect was devastating: in a few months her candidature declined. the 
popular judgment was obviously not made about the candidate, but about 
the traditional party. It was questioned whether the candidate would have 
sufficient strength and political will to break with ad and Copei, the parties 
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of the elite pact, which were judged as being principally responsible for the 
country’s political and social crisis. Her fall in the polls could not necessarily 
be credited to the emergence of an anti-party or anti-political feeling, but to 
the anxieties, as much on the part of the middle class as the popular sectors, 
of a renovation of the parties and the political class. or, to use the expression 
known from Pareto, of an anxiety over the “recycling of the political elite.”
the landslide electoral victory of Chávez in december, 1998, who 
received 58% of the valid votes facing his opponent enrique salas Romer Feo2, 
the candidate who publicly assumed the option of continuing the neoliberal 
agenda implemented by the two previous governments, brought important 
changes to venezuelan politics, and to Latin-american politics itself.
the Chávez political action distinguished itself, in the first place, by 
the fact of “having failed as a traditional military coup and having triumphed 
as a popular electoral movement” (Lombardi, 2003, pp. 15-16). In the 
second place, despite a lack of confidence regarding his personal style, creating 
institutional change which reverted to the 1961 Constitution, transformation 
of the bicameral parliament to unicameral, election of judges, and above all, 
the evacuation of the old bipartisan system, indicate a strong preference for the 
management of change by democratic means” (Lombardi, 2003, p. 16).
In addition, in spite of venezuela’s continuing high rate of poverty,3 
there had been a clear popular differentiation between the effectiveness of the 
regime in treating this problem and the bet placed on the leader. the fact that 
Chávez reached the end of his first term with popular approval rates above 70% 
reveals that the regime’s political judgment, which is considered inefficient and 
incapable of changing the venezuelan situation as a developing country and 
with chronic problems of poverty, did not extend to Chávez’s leadership.
Finally, the strategic use of nationalistic symbols, highlighted by use of 
Bolivarian discourse and the Bolivarian legacy, acquired a certain singularity in 
the Chávez project. the figure of Bolívar allowed such a symbol of venezuelan 
nationality to be transformed into a kind of legitimizing source and authority 
for the individual political figure – Hugo Chávez. such a strategy, in this 
manner, transcended simple appeal, reaching ancestralism. the recovery of 
Bolivarian discourse, in a country where the historical personage and example 
of Bolívar has continued to mold venezuelan nationality, has a politically 
important effectiveness, to the extent that it offers concreteness to abstract 
discussion. Chávez has made Bolivarian discourse a concrete instrument 
of political action. thus, the Bolivarian discourse ceased being only one 
extra-historical factor in the mixture of elements of venezuelan nationality, 
transforming itself into a concrete political instrument, in the name of 
which was launched a fight against the immense corruption of venezuelan 
institutions, in the name of which was justified the frontal attack on traditional 
parties and the threat to close institutions such as Congress and the Judiciary. 
(Cf. villa, 1999).
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In addition, the emergence of Hugo Chávez within Latin-american 
politics might be characterized as a kind of intervention of populist leadership 
that, in spite of having toppled a party system and having embraced a harsh 
discourse against traditional parties, is, properly speaking, not an anti-party 
leadership as had, at the same time, been that of Collor de Mello in Brazil and 
Fujimori in Peru. 
It can be pointed out, however, that Chávez was not able to 
institutionalize a political base and a new party system in venezuela. What 
could be called his party, the Movement v Republic (MvR), is one more 
heterogeneous front of political and social forces, in which were housed 
nationalistic and traditional leftist sectors as well as sectors emanating from the 
hegemonic parties of puntofijismo. But, contrary to what was established in the 
Punto Fijo party system, in which party fidelity is a strong characteristic of the 
sectors centered around ad and Copei, such sector fidelity is not associated 
with the institution, the MvR, but with the figure of Chávez himself. there 
were no “adecos” or “copeyanos,” as the sectors and militants of the two 
largest Punto Fijo parties were known. on the contrary, there is a militancy 
and a political and electoral identification that is merely Chavista . 
on the other side, the opposition in the Chávez era is still sufficiently 
fragmented, not having been able to reestablish and legitimize itself electorally. 
the programmatic proposal seems, in some way, to have become reduced to 
an anti-Chavist proclamation. the fact should be recognized, however, that 
the sectors of unionism, of patronage, segments from venezuelan Petroleum 
(Pdvsa) and from the communications media, all were connected to the 
old elites, even if it were those that appeared joined in opposition, and which 
have, from my point of view, their origin in a failure of the political dynamic 
that began in the Chávez era: the weakening of the party system that headed the 
1958-1998 pact of elites  did not mean institutionalizing a new party system, 
or a renewal of political leadership and strengthening of new organizations of 
socialized civil society in democratic values. Moreover, the weakening of the 
old party system left an institutional vacuum that went on to be filled by 
organizational experiments in which the line that divided politics from the 
paramilitary is quite debatable. In the absence of the renewed framework 
of social institutions, representation and aggregation of interests took place 
by means of the Bolivarian vicious circles tied to bureaucratic practices, or 
corrupted corporate institutions, such as the Workers Center of venezuela 
(Ctv) and the Fedecamaras (representatives from the workers and patronage, 
respectively), who have support from the major part of the television and print 
media (Cf. villa, 2004).
However, in spite of the high indices of popularity and legitimacy 
attached to the figure of Chávez, such elements did not translate into national 
institutional stability. In this sense, underlying everything else, what has to be 
pointed out is the electoral phenomenon and the phenomenon of popularity by 
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which the prominence of Hugo Chávez has been transformed in recent Latin-
american political history. In the first elections in which Chávez participated, 
in december 1998, he won the presidency with 56.2% of the votes; in the 
so- called “re-legitimize” process4 of July 2000 he received 59.7% of the votes, 
and in the recall referendum of august 2004, received 59.1%5. How then can 
this paradox be explained in which political legitimacy does not correspond to 
social consensus?
My explanation is that Chávez broke with a fundamental characteristic 
of the democratic system that was inaugurated in 1958, i.e., the multi-class 
representation and organization of institutions, in favor of the poorest sectors 
of the population, which became his main political base. this novelty in 
venezuelan politics leads us to interpret the change in the Chávez era not only 
on political bases but also in socio-political bases.
Social and political polarization in the Chávez era
a distinctive trait of Chávez’ domestic politics is that the opposition 
between political forces ceased to be strictly political in nature in order to 
transform them into an openly social conflict. at least some scholars of the 
venezuelan political process have pointed to such a process as transformation 
of social polarization into political polarization (Planes, 2003; ellner and 
Hellinger, 2003). How could this have occurred? 
Chávez assumed the venezuelan presidency in February 1999 and, in July 
of the same year, promoted elections for the election of the national Constituent 
assembly (anC), which would produce a new constitution to substitute for the 
one from 1961. the Chavista  forces received an overwhelming majority in the 
anC, electing 125 deputies, while the opposition only managed to elect six. 
approved in december of 1999, the new Constitution has among its safeguards 
the fact of having established new agendas for restoration of judicial power and 
raising the number of public branches of power to five: besides the three classic 
branches (executive, Legislative and Judicial), Citizen and electoral branches 
were both present in MBR200 documents in the 1990s. Besides this, the new 
Constitution, which changed the name of venezuela to Bolivarian Republic 
of venezuela, also gave the vote to the military and transformed the legislative 
branch from bicameral to unicameral, giving the national assembly maximum 
jurisdiction (Cf. Maya, 2003).
among the criticism of the new Constitution, foremost was the 
excessive concentration of power in the hands of the president, who went on 
to have inclusive power to legislate by means of the Enabling Act with respect 
to any matter. at the end of 2000, the national assembly approved a package 
of 49 enabling decrees. two of these decrees, in particular, caused considerable 
controversy in the country: 
the Hydrocarbons Law, which governs the petroleum sector, and the Land 
Law, which deals with agrarian reform and development. In the first case, 
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because the government went on to require that the venezuelan capital had 
majority shares in the partnerships with foreign petroleum companies active 
in the country, which the defenders of liberalization of the sector saw as a 
regression. the government even increased the royalties charged per barrel 
of oil from 16.6% to 30%, although this measure was attenuated by the 
reduction from 64% to 50% of the tax on petroleum income. now the debate 
over the Law of Lands is a little more complex. It is widely accepted that it was 
the oligarchy’s sense of horror that caused president Hugo Chávez to uphold 
article 342 in the Bolivarian Constitution, which was already in the Letter 
of 1961, recommending that the “regime of large estates is contrary to social 
interest” in venezuela (uchoa, 2003, p. 56).
Beginning with intense discussion of these two enabling  laws, 
radicalization emerged in the Chavista  discourse and in the discourse of the 
opposition, generating a picture of polarization of the political field of “us 
and them.” the result was that the middle class, besides feeling few positive 
signs of recovery of its status and the high socio-economic standard of life of 
the 1970s and the beginning of 1980, began to question the effectiveness of 
the presidential rhetoric in combating unemployment (around 18% at the end 
of 2002), social inequality and urban violence, besides feeling uncomfortable 
with the radicalized language of Chávez. 
Chávez also did not take into account that the venezuelan middle class 
would not have sufficient patience to wait for more reforms that would enable 
the functioning of the old and exhausted venezuelan democratic clientele 
political system, which had begun in 1958. It needs to be pointed out that part 
of the middle class generation that protested in the streets of Caracas against 
Chávez is the same one that grew up in the best years of the venezuelan oil 
boom in the 1970s and the beginning of 1980. the demands of this social 
sector are very far from the “peaceful and Bolivarian revolution” that had been 
preached. the expectation of these sectors of the middle class in december 
1998 when they voted Chávez in, was that the new government would make 
the old, exhausted populist system function anew, in an effective way” (vivas, 
1999, pp. 96-97).
the symptoms of the transformation of the social polarization into 
political polarization manifested itself at three important moments. In the first 
place, it has been pointed out that the petroleum industry strike occurred at 
the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003, when only informal sectors of 
the economy continued their activities. secondly, the attempted coup d’état 
of april 2002 can be highlighted. “the massive march in april 11 [of  2002] 
which began the coup attempt started from the well-to-do zones of Caracas 
and was composed mainly of members of the middle class.” In counterpart, 
in this period, the popular sectors of Caracas united with segments of the 
armed Forces that were faithful to Chávez in order to reinstall command of 
the government to the deposed president. the third moment, in turn, refers 
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to the presidential referendum of august 15, 2004, in which Chávez obtained 
a massive vote from among the same popular sectors. the result of these facts 
was, then, a period of enormous political instability between the second half of 
2001 and the second half of 2004. How to explain this?
some of the more recent studies have called attention to the fact that 
social polarization in venezuela is not a phenomenon that appeared precisely 
with the Chávez government. after the Caracaso of the beginning of 1989, 
“the poor considered any middle and upper class neighborhood of Caracas 
as enemy territory […] but the distrust is mutual. the middle class is afraid 
that the poor is at the point of invading their communities” (interview with 
the director of a venezuelan nGo, in ellner, 2003, pp. 34-35). But, by any 
means, until the first electoral triumph in 1998, the Chávez social base of 
support was sufficiently broad. at his 1998 election speech, close to a kind of 
justified crusade against the traditional political figures and the Punto Fijo 
oligarchy, he embodied the most popular sectors, but also a good part of 
the middle class affected by the economic crisis that had crushed them since 
the 1980s, extending through the whole of the 1990s. However, in spite of 
Chávez not having created the class polarization, it is a fact that he stimulated 
it, as is well suggested in the work by Roberts (2003, p. 94) and ellner.
after his first electoral victory Chávez was increasingly supported by the 
poorest sectors […]  It is notable that the great marches of support for Chávez 
were organized in the west zone of Caracas, where the sectors with less 
resources were concentrated, while the opposition marches occurred in the 
urbanized zones of the east of the capital [in which were quartered the most 
wealthy class and the middle classes] (ellner, 2003, p. 36).
after the failed coup of april 11, 2002, one of Chávez’s objectives 
was to reconquer the support of the social middle class by means of the use 
of language of national conciliation and effective public policies. In order to 
reach such a goal, he could have taken advantage of the weakness and lethargy 
of the entrepreneurial sectors associated with the commitment of its directors 
to the failed coup. Chávez even attempted this peacemaking movement, but 
a problem existed that seemed to have been beyond his calculations: the 
country had reached such a degree of political and social polarization that the 
president had a reduced margin for the possibility of conciliation. What this 
meant, in other words, was that political hatreds by a large margin overrode 
the possibility of national conciliation in venezuela at that time. From the 
historical point of view, such polarization is only comparable to the polarized 
hatred in argentina in the era of Juan domingo Perón.
as such, in this pre-referendum frame, the political scenario that 
emerged with the radicalizing of political and social speech generated, 
as a result, conditions which went beyond the limited strategy of protest 
marches and pan-beating demonstrations on the part of the opposition, to a 
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comprehensive strategy. they demanded the president’s departure at any cost, 
even if such an alternative implied the latent risk of a coup d’état. adding to 
the situation was the absence of a judicious political adviser of the Chavista  
administration close to the circles of power, i.e., “chief of staff,” who could 
serve as a moderating force for the impulses of the president that many times 
were authoritarian, or that might help in unifying the opposition. 
the epilogue of the polarization of the political and social forces in 
venezuela of the Hugo Chávez period was provided in the discussion about 
the presidential recall referendum in the middle of 2004. the most dramatic 
effect of this outcome was to show the degree of instability, and even the 
lack of credibility, of fundamental institutions such as the judiciary and 
the electoral branches. Both were overcome by the intense politicizing that 
enveloped venezuelan society, which allowed insider groups to make use of 
them by adapting the rules to their immediate desires.
Post-referendum Venezuela: possibilities for 
reinstitutionalizing the political system
Ratification of the continuity of Hugo Chávez’s presidential mandate 
took place on august 15, 2004, and was categorical. the president received 
59.1% of the valid votes of the venezuelan electors, against 40% by the 
opposition in the referendum.6 What are the factors that brought about such 
a crushing triumph by a controversial venezuelan figure within a picture of 
political and social polarization? the hypothesis that might be suggested, 
as much to explain the electoral phenomenon in which Chávez transformed 
Presidente Hugo Chávez speaks to his electorate at its beginning in Caracas.
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himself, as to explain his steadfastness from the political instability, is that 
his regime was strongly legitimized in cleavages that went beyond the 
political. the political dimension expressing itself in popular and electoral 
approval ratings is a consequence of concrete social options and measures 
that are advantageous to the most marginalized sectors of the venezuelan 
population, above all after the coup of april 11, 2002, when this social sector’s 
identification with the figure of Chávez became clear.
In the first place, it points to the positive impact of the social plans, 
known as Bolivarian Missions (Misiones), within broad popular sectors, 
and in at least a third of the middle class sectors. such plans consisted of 
emergency social measures, of which three short and medium-term measures 
and one long term are prominent. the short and medium term measures are: 
the health program Bairro Adentro (inside the neighborhood), within which 
doctors, Cubans in the majority, make daily consultations and remain on call 
24 hours a day in the poorest regions of the country; the Mercal people’s 
market programs, which are a kind of popular food fair, in which more than 
twenty products of the “basic basket”of essential foods can be bought for a 
government subsidized price; and the distribution program of free ready-to-
eat food for popular sectors living in nearly indigent conditions. the long-
term effect plan concentrated on the area of education and had three fronts: 
the Robinson Mission, the intent of which was to make more than 1.5 million 
people literate between the years of 2003 and 2004; the Ribas Mission, the 
objective of which was to stimulate people to reenroll in the high school 
subsystem who hadn’t finished their studies; and, finally, the Sucre Mission, 
directed toward university level education, the concrete expression of which 
was the Bolivarian university, which proposes(d) incorporating five hundred 
thousand students who were without places into the public and private 
subsystems of university education.
In the second place, Chávez’s victory was, without doubt, associated 
with the economy’s positive behavior in macroeconomic indicators beginning 
in 2004, and the redistributive effects of this growth. according to Central 
Bank of venezuela (BCv)7  after the strike at the end of 2002 and the 
beginning of 2003, a substantial recovery of the economy took place in 2004. 
In the first half of this last year, the GnP grew 23.1% compared to the same 
period in 2003.8 this behavior of the economy, in turn, was reflected in the 
decline in unemployment, which went from 18% in the first half of 2003 to 
15% in the first half of 2004. Besides this, the average price of venezuelan oil 
reached record prices. Fortuna (fortune) seems to follow the management of 
president Chávez, given that the financing of the so-called Misiones (Missions) 
depends fundamentally on petroleum, for which the Economic Development 
Fund was created within the Pdvsa, which not only finances the Misiones 
but also different works of infra-structure in different regions of the country 
(Quantum, 2004, p. 5). 
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It should be pointed out, however, that the effects of the august, 2004 
referendum’s results embrace both positive and negative effects for venezuela 
that extend to the present time. among the positive aspects, we should 
highlight the fact that the referendum enabled a country to emerge that, in 
spite of being socially polarized, went on to become less polarized politically, 
contrary to what was imagined prior to the referendum. one of the greatest 
fears in terms of the possibility of this occurring was that the winning side 
would obtain only a small margin of difference over the loser, allowing the 
referendum to electorally institutionalize the country’s polarization. From this 
point of view, the scenario would potentially destabilize the institutions. But 
the actual result, which brought president Chávez about 60% of the electoral 
vote, besides assuring him a wide margin of legitimacy after more than 
four years of government, opened better perspectives to him for governing. 
Moreover, it made possible a renewal of a dialogue with and a new beginning 
of an approach to the opposition’s moderate political segments, with the 
business sectors, and with the communications media, which began to occur 
with business sectors, including private communications media, at the end of 
the second half of 2004. The consequence of this dialogue was a minimal degree 
of reinstitutionalizing of the governing system, while staying far away from being 
a renewed pact in the mold of Punto Fijo.
on the other hand, the referendum showed that the electoral picture 
was more complex than was supposed, based on the a priori political choices 
of the social sectors. Before the referendum the idea had prevailed that all the 
popular sectors would vote en masse in favor of chavism and that the middle 
class would vote en masse against chavism. a brief analysis of the electoral 
data shows that, in low-income regions of Caracas, the district capital, 23% to 
31% voted for Chávez’s leaving, while in middle class regions of the capital the 
voting rates against his leaving power in certain electoral zones varied between 
30% to 37%.
starting from this data, then, we could deduce that an explanation, in 
part, of the significant difference of nearly 20% in favor of those who voted 
for Hugo Chávez to remain in power was the important volume of votes that 
Chávez received from middle class sectors. It is true that nearly 70% of the low 
income electors, as predicted, voted against the departure of Hugo Chávez. 
However, it was a portion of the middle class, approximately a third, that was 
the differential factor in the president’s favor. thus unmasked is the myth that 
was created in subsequent years, that all citizens of the popular sectors had 
a great tendency to be favorable to the president’s government and that all 
middle class citizens were potentially opposed to Chávez.
However, an equally important number was the 40% of the votes 
that the opposition managed to capture. It was quite true that an excessively 
polarized result (let’s say 51% of the votes in favor and 49% against) was not 
of much concern in relation to the country’s social and institutional stability. 
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However, showing the weakness of one of the sectors, and principally if it 
were from the opposition, would also not have been of much concern. thus, 
the 40% obtained by the opposition made it electorally viable for future 
electoral confrontations. In this way, if we take into account that the electoral 
distribution is socially less polarized than imagined, and that the margin of 
votes obtained by the government as well as by the opposition is politically and 
quantitatively significant, the scenario of the reemergence of a party system 
with multi-class social bases, which was one of the best contributions toward a 
strengthening of the democratic institutions offered by venezuelan democracy 
until 1998, offered opportunities that the various political actors could exploit 
in the debate about reconstituting a system of representative parties, ending 
the dominance over representation by such sectors as the communications 
media and business that, erroneously assumed, had produced disastrous 
results: this was well demonstrated in the april coup of 2002.
an equally relevant result of the referendum is that it managed to 
neutralize, and even isolate, the most radical sectors in the government as 
well as in the opposition, and the practitioners of violence who represented 
factors active not only in the governing crises in recent years, but also in their 
constant appeal to activities concerned with overthrow and the rejection of 
democratically instituted rules.  
In conclusion, two negative post-referendum aspects need to be 
brought out. the first refers to the victory that chavism had in correlation 
with the strengths of the venezuelan political system. Between the second 
half of 2004 and the second of 2005, legislative elections were conducted 
at all levels (representatives, state and national representatives), as well as 
executive elections for mayors and governors that also took place. In turn, 
the presidential election was scheduled for the end of 2006. Within this 
scenario, the political and psychological impact of Chavez’s victory in the 
referendum might cause the political system to turn less pluralistic in regard 
to the representation of the different political forces, causing an excessive 
concentration in the executive and legislative bureaucracy - which is certainly 
legitimate if it is a result of the popular will, however undesirable it may be 
from the point of view of plurality and counterbalancing of political forces in 
the system. In this regard one warning sign was that chavism and its allied 
sectors obtained victories in the 2004 elections for governor that took place 
in twenty of the 22 government contests, less than two months after the 
presidential referendum.
the second troubling aspect, and this became obvious by the 
referendum’s result, was the continued absence of an opposition proposal 
with, as a first condition, the renewal of the puntofijismo sector that had once 
widely dominated venezuelan political life. In the absence of a renewed board 
of directors of the opposition, all that remains of this opposition is its appeal 
for discussions of political survival, such as the accusation of referendum fraud, 
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Youth wearing military clothing as an allusion to the Venezuelan president during a march 
in Caracas.
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which reduced its credibility among its own internal bases and condemned 
it to international isolation, at least in Latin america, providing, once more, 
assistance in the consolidation of chavism as the only dominant force in 
venezuela. 
Conclusion
through the combination of effective use of the instruments of 
political and social action by Hugo Chávez and the venezuelan opposition’s 
own mistakes, the Chavist position was consolidated as the dominating force 
in venezuela. the political emergence of Chávez represents, in the political 
history of democratic venezuela that began in 1958, an indisputable dividing 
line. analyzing the behavior and strategies of the principal political actors 
in the Chávez period, above all starting in 2001 until the referendum, it is 
possible to realize the meaning of schumpeter’s statement, that democracy 
represents “a political method,” a “certain type of institutional arrangement 
for reaching political decisions,” to the extent that it is possible to observe that 
it was not treated at any moment as an end in itself by the venezuelan actors of 
the Chávez period,  but on the other hand, as an instrument.
In other words, democracy between the years 2001 and 2003 did not 
seem a priority goal, given that the participating factions in the conflict did 
not have as a plan tolerating each others’ positions and differences, in such a 
way as to reach a democratic solution. the result is that the institutions, the 
principal channel by which conflicts are transmitted and processed, wound up 
becoming instruments in favor of the factions’ partisan positions.
 Notes
1  among these smaller parties we find the Republican democratic union, which in its 
principal leadership was Jóvito villalba, ideologically located in the cultured part of the 
center-right.
2  the most obvious symptom of the total loss of traditional party prestige was the fact 
that the major politicians of the ad and Copei parties abandoned their candidates in 
the last months of the 1998 general election and went on to support the candidacy 
of salas Feo, who neither belonged to one of these two parties nor to any other small 
traditional party
3  venezuela occupied 75th place on the 2005 united nations Index of Human 
development (IdH) list, only ranking higher than countries like Peru, Paraguay and 
Bolívia.
 Religitimation was the act by which all the elected positions in the 1998 elections, from 
president to major city representatives, underwent an electoral ratification process. 
5  see http://www.cne.gov.ve/resultados/, 9/14/2005 consulted.
6  see http://www.cne.gov.ve/resultados/, 9/14/2005 consulted.
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7  Central Bank is autonomous in venezuela.
8  ver http://www.bcv.org.ve.
9  ver http://www.cne.gov.ve/resultados/, 9/17/2005 consulted.
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AbstrAct - the democratic era in venezuela dates from 1958. With the Hugo 
Chávez administration, the nation has experienced a true breach in its national 
political scene. therefore it now becomes possible to identify a democratic venezuela 
pre- and post-Chavez. this article attempts to analyze the variables of political and 
institutional change in venezuela at four specific moments in time: first, during 
the rise and fall of the Punto Fijo Pact; second, the build-up of the Chavista  
phenomenon; third, the social and political polarization in venezuela during the 
Chavez administration; and finally, venezuela after the presidential referendum.
Keywords - Hugo Chávez, Punto Fijo, Political and social Polarizations, 
Referendum.
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